Introduction

Humans are storytellers. This is one of the characteristics of humans that distinguishes them from other species. We tell stories regarding our experience in the world we live in and also of fictional worlds that we create which mimic our own as we try to make sense of what’s within and without. “The universe is made of stories, not of atoms”, wrote Rukeyser (1968), poetically capturing what has since become a central idea in psychology, philosophy, and literary studies alike.

Starting from early childhood, human beings are constantly immersed in stories, particularly through their parents’ telling them stories and picture books, which plays an immense role in cognitive development and emotional bonding (Fiese et al., 1999). From the bedtime stories to the great literary classics, narratives give form to our comprehension of others’ emotions, thoughts, and intentions (Kidd & Castano, 2013; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Zunshine, 2006). Through narrative, we practise perspective-taking and simulate mental states, which are core components of theory of mind and mentalisation. As such, fiction is not merely entertainment; it may serve as a powerful tool for social cognition and a means of coping with existential concerns (Kidd & Castano, 2013; Mar et al., 2009)

Stories, then, serve not only to entertain, but to cultivate social and cognitive skills which aid us in navigating our complex interpersonal webs (Mar, 2011; Zunshine, 2006). Furthermore, the capacity of the creator to construct, the people to share, and the individual to interpret stories demonstrates a fundamental psychological achievement for our species: the ability to grasp the inner worlds, or the mental states, of ourselves and others (Bruner, 1990; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Tomasello, 2003).

This ability is known as Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to attribute thoughts, beliefs, emotions and motives to oneself and to others, being able to recognise that others may have mental states different from one’s own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Not just a mere academic construct, ToM is at the heart of our social lives. Whether we are comforting a friend in distress, facing a moral dilemma at work (Young & Dungan, 2011), reading the news online (Mar, 2011), understanding another’s simple communicative efforts (Astington & Baird, 2005; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000) or the more taxing act of comprehending the actual meaning behind someone’s ironic comments (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Happé, 1993), we are putting our ToM skills to use.

Although ToM is often approached as a singular capacity, contemporary research suggests it is better understood as a multidimensional construct composed of distinct yet interrelated components (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Closely related to, but conceptually distinct from ToM, are the constructs of mentalisation and empathy which are two essential aspects of social cognition. Mentalisation is the developmental capacity to understand and interpret one’s own and others’ behaviour in terms of intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, feelings, and thoughts. It emerges in the context of early attachment relationships and underlies the organisation of the self by allowing individuals to reflect on internal experiences and make behaviour meaningful and predictable (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Empathy, on the other hand, operates in an affective manner, being the capacity to recognise, share, and respond to others’ emotions (Batson, 2009; Decety & Jackson, 2004). Though they may rely on different mechanisms, mentalisation and empathy work in harmony for social functioning in a combined effort (Decety & Lamm, 2006).

As children grow older, they increasingly comprehend and produce more complex narratives, which develops alongside their growing capacity to make sense of human behaviour in terms of inner mental states, a process known as mentalisation. Similar progression can be observed in literature: while early fictional narratives may have focused on simple or concrete themes, later works of fiction began to explore human beings’ psychological depth and existential concerns (Oatley, 2011). The belles-lettres of the world, from the Epic of Gilgamesh at the dawn of civilisation to Danielewski’s House of Leaves, force readers to confront death, choice, freedom, and meaning. These existential themes echo Freud’s (1930/2010) claim that discontent became a defining feature of human experience with the rise of civilization. While non-human animals may feel anxious at the prospect of danger, and feel the same range of emotions as us in other parts of their lives (Panksepp, 1998), humans have a unique written history of reflecting upon suffering, finitude, and absurdity.

This thesis examines how literary fiction is associated with key components of social cognition, specifically, mentalisation and empathy, and how these are, in turn, associated with existential anxiety. Mentalisation refers to the dynamic and context-sensitive interpretation of others’ mental states, and empathy encompasses the affective resonance with others’ emotions. Differentiating among these constructs is crucial, as each plays a distinct role in understanding fictional characters and engaging with complex narratives. By bringing together findings from developmental psychology, social cognition, and literary research, this study offers an integrative framework to investigate the associations among fiction reading, social-cognitive capacities, and existential concerns.

1.1 Key Theoretical Constructs/Concepts and Definitions

In the following sections, mentalisation, empathy, anxiety, and existential concerns will be briefly defined.

1.1.1. Literary Fiction

Literary fiction, a subset of fiction, and therefore of narrative, is often described as imaginative writing that prioritises stylistic richness and psychological depth. Narratives are structured representations of events (real or imagined) arranged in time and often involving goal-driven characters (Bruner, 1990; Herman, 2009). Fiction, as a narrative subset, contains non-factual content and is defined by its imaginative qualities (Bruner, 1990). Literary fiction, in turn, is distinguished not merely by genre but by its use of stylistic foregrounding, ambiguity, and the potential to provoke introspection and insight (Miall & Kuiken, 1999). It often departs from conventional language and structure, encouraging readers to reflect on familiar concepts from unfamiliar perspectives, a process known as defamiliarisation.

1.1.2. Mentalisation

Mentalisation is the capacity to reflect upon and understand one’s own and others’ mental states, including thoughts, beliefs, and intentions (Fonagy & Bateman, 2019). In another sense, this is the ability to see behind the outward actions and behaviours of others, interpreting the underlying thoughts and beliefs. Mentalisation is often discussed in relation to ToM, the broad capacity to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions) to oneself and others as well as use this information to understand, respond to, and predict social behaviours (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 2018). While ToM reflects a foundational cognitive ability, mentalisation encompasses a developmentally grounded process that includes affective understanding and self-reflection, dimensions often captured by the concept of reflective functioning (Fonagy & Target, 1997). Mentalisation is primarily concerned with understanding the mental states that underlie emotions and actions. This distinction is crucial, as one may infer what another person feels without necessarily sharing or experiencing that emotion (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).

1.1.3. Empathy

Empathy is the capacity to understand and share others’ emotional states (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Though it is a separate concept from both ToM and mentalisation, contemporary research is increasingly viewing it as the affective dimension of social cognition, working in conjunction with mentalisation (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Empathy is the ability to not only recognise others’ feelings but to mirror them, hence its key role for bonding, prosocial behaviour, and moral reasoning (Batson, 2009; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009). Empathy is further divided into two separate factors, cognitive and affective empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Cognitive empathy refers to the capacity to discern a person’s emotional perspective, though sharing that emotion is not necessary (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer & Lamm, 2009), and affective empathy is the capacity to share and experience the other’s emotional state, creating a sense of emotional resonance or emotional contagion (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Though these definitions seem conceptually close to that of mentalisation, what sets them apart is that mentalisation can be self-related as well as other-related, while empathy is other-related only. Furthermore, other-related mentalisation is concerned with the general mental state of the other, while empathy is concerned with the other’s emotional states.

1.1.4. Anxiety

Anxiety is an emotional state that involves heightened arousal, negative affect, and concern about potential threats or uncertain situations (Barlow, 2002). Though often experienced as an aversive emotion, anxiety plays an important evolutionary role as it promotes vigilance, preparing one for possible future dangers (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). It is a protective mechanism which assists threat detection, amplifies attention, and prepares the individual for appropriate response (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). If it is chronic or not situation appropriate, however, it may negatively impact cognitive flexibility, emotion regulation, and effective social functioning (Shields et al., 1972). High anxiety is associated with hypervigilance, attentional biases regarding threat-related information, and misinterpretation, often resulting in maladaptive behaviour in social contexts (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In social contexts, anxiety may limit attentional resources, disrupt working memory capacity (Eysenck et al., 2007), and cause individuals to be overly preoccupied with internal states or social threats, which in turn leads to misinterpretation of others’ thoughts, beliefs, emotions and intentions (Hezel & McNally, 2014).

1.1.5. Existential Concerns

Mortality, freedom, isolation and a search for meaning have been identified as the core existential concerns by Yalom (1980). According to Yalom (1980), each individual struggles with the fact that death is inevitable, both for oneself and others, that freedom, while usually seen as a positive state, also comes with the burden of responsibility for the choices one makes, that loneliness is an inherent part of existence, and finally that there is no objective meaning to life, but rather a subjective one that is for each individual to craft for themselves. These concerns are an inherent part of what is known as the “human condition” (van Bruggen et al., 2017). According to Yalom (1980), confronting these concerns leads to either existential anxiety or personal growth. Hence, these concerns are not positive or negative in and of themselves. Like anxiety, it is the persistent and unresolved preoccupation with these concerns that determines their psychological impact.